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Proﬁt maximizing behavior on the part of ﬁrms is a fundamental, but rarely tested,
assumption of economics. In this paper, I analyze the decisions made by an MIT trained
economist running a company that delivers bagels and donuts. The simplicity and
transparency of the business (e.g. marginal cost is easily observed) allow for relatively
direct tests of proﬁt maximization in the quantities delivered each day and the prices that
are charged. Using twelve years of data representing more than 80,000 deliveries, I ﬁnd
that the company is extremely adept and determining how many bagels and donuts to
deliver to a particular customer on a given day. The company appears to price on the
inelastic portion of the short-run demand curve for the entire period. These pricing
choices are inconsistent with short-run proﬁt maximization, although they can potentially
be reconciled with a dynamic optimization model.
& 2016 The Author. Published by Elsevier Ltd. on behalf of University of Venice. This is an
open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
The assumption of proﬁt maximizing behavior by ﬁrms is one of the oldest, most fundamental, and widely applied in all
of economics. Virtually all models of production start with proﬁt maximization. The assumption of proﬁt maximization is
particularly central to modern empirical industrial organization techniques which rely on indirect identiﬁcation approaches
to overcome the fact that critical components of the inputs to a ﬁrm's decision (e.g. marginal cost) are not observable to the
econometrician.1
In principle, testing for violations of proﬁt maximization is straightforward. At least in the long run, no proﬁt maximizing
ﬁrm should set price below marginal cost, choose a price at which residual demand is inelastic, or stop production when
marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost. Yet, direct attempts to empirically test the assumption of proﬁt maximization are
quite rare. One reason is that real-world ﬁrms are typically quite complex, producing multiple goods and using large
numbers of inputs. As a consequence, detailed information on marginal cost is rarely available. Estimating the price elas-
ticity of demand is also not a trivial task, although great progress has been made in this area in recent years. A few prior
analyses have attempted to overcome these difﬁculties. Genesove and Mullin (1998) analyzes the sugar industry in ther Ltd. on behalf of University of Venice. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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them to measure marginal costs accurately. Wolfram (1999) and Hortacsu and Puller (2005) both study the electricity
industry, in which the short run marginal costs are almost exclusively driven by fuel costs.
In this paper, I analyze data from a company that delivers donuts and bagels to Washington, DC area businesses. Workers at
these ﬁrms buy these goods on the honor system, depositing their payment in a lock-box that is picked up later the same day.
The data generated by this business provide a unique window into the question of proﬁt maximization.2 There are a
number of reasons why this ﬁrm would a priori be a leading candidate to maximize proﬁts. First, the service the ﬁrm
provides is very simple. The ﬁrm has only one line of business. The marginal cost of delivering one more bagel or donut to an
existing customer is simply the wholesale price of the good, a number which is easily observed by the company's owner.
Second, the ﬁrm gets frequent and detailed signals of demand. Each day, for each customer, the owner chooses the quantity
of bagels and donuts to deliver. Later that day he observes how many of the goods go uneaten, as well as the revenue
collected.3 Third, the owner is well-trained in the principles of proﬁt maximization. He is ABD in Economics from MIT
(studying under Paul Samuelson in the mid-1960s), has published research in Journal of Political Economy (Feldman, 1971),
and spent more than twenty years working as a professional economist before starting this business. Fourth, the owner both
makes the decisions and is the residual claimant on the proﬁt ﬂows; there is no principal-agent problem at work.
Analyzing 13 years of data representing more than 80,000 deliveries of bagels and donuts to clients, the ﬁndings con-
cerning proﬁt maximization are mixed. The company is extremely adept at choosing the optimal quantities to deliver on a
daily basis at a given price. The fact that the ﬁrm gets quantities almost exactly right, combined with the fact that the proﬁt
function is ﬂat near the optimum, implies that there is little scope for improving proﬁts in this dimension. Although I show
that a regression model can improve on the ﬁrm's choices, it improves the bottom line by just a fraction of a percent.
In stark contrast, however, the prices set by the ﬁrm deviate substantially from those predicted by static pricing models.
The ﬁrm prices on the inelastic part of the short-run demand curve over the entire period under study, i.e. price increases
lead to an increase in both revenues and proﬁts. If the static pricing model is the correct one, then back-of-the-envelope
calculations suggest that mispricing lowers ﬁrm proﬁts by perhaps 30%. To the extent that dynamic considerations (such as
entry deterrence or longer run behavioral adjustments of consumers) are at work, this crude estimate will be an upper
bound on the losses due to mispricing.
In light of the information available to the ﬁrm, the patterns observed are not particularly surprising. The ﬁrm receives
daily feedback regarding each customer's demand for the goods at a given price, and given this information, incorporates it
extremely efﬁciently. The daily activities of the ﬁrm, in contrast, yield little information that is useful in determining the
optimal price. The ﬁrm perceives price changes as costly to make, thus they occur infrequently. Thus, one would expect that
the ﬁrm would do a better job of choosing quantity conditional on price then identifying the optimal price.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data set in greater detail. Section 3 derives
the proﬁt maximizing choices in a model that captures key aspects of the ﬁrm's decision, which is a two-good version of the
“newsboy” problem (Mills, 1959). Section 4 presents the results testing for proﬁt maximization. Section 5 concludes.2. Background and data
The company began operations in 1984. The nature of the business is straightforward. It purchases bagels, cream cheese,
and donuts wholesale, which it delivers to local businesses in the morning. The food is left in a central area, along with a sign
that states the prices, and a wooden lock-box in which customers leave their payments on the honor system. Later that day,
a company employee returns to collect the money and any uneaten pastries are taken away and discarded.4 Other than
securing approval from the ofﬁce manager for permission to provide the bagel and donuts, the company has little direct
interaction with the customers it supplies. The company does not charge the ofﬁces to which it delivers for the service
provided. Revenues accrue solely from payments for the bagels and donuts.5 The typical client ﬁrm receives a delivery once
per week. In an average week in the sample, the company delivers more than 3000 bagels and 1500 donuts to roughly 125
different clients.
The founder of the company generously provided detailed records of the ﬁrm's operations. These data consist of the
number of bagels and donuts and amount of cream cheese delivered, the amount of money collected per day, and the
number of bagels and donuts that go uneaten. All of this information is reported separately for each client, each day. In
addition, the data include both the posted prices that customers are charged and the wholesale costs of the bagels, cream
cheese, and donuts.6 These data cover the period January 1993 to December 2005. As noted earlier, the company began2 The analysis I undertake encompasses only a part of the ﬁrm's overall proﬁt maximization. I do not examine whether the ﬁrm is cost minimizing in
its choice of inputs, how it attracts new customers, or its decision concerning which products and services to supply.
3 Because customers pay on the honor system, revenues are not simply the quantity eaten multiplied by the posted price.
4 For more details of the daily operations, see Levitt and Dubner (2005).
5 A small number of companies pay full price in advance for the company's services as a perk for company employees. These companies are excluded
from the analysis of this paper.
6 I also know something about the wages and other operating costs paid by the ﬁrm, but these are not used in the analysis.
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Within-customer standard deviation
Number of bagels delivered 30.032 25.125 14.326
Number of bagels eaten 27.450 24.400 14.003
Number of donuts delivered 13.639 13.490 6.446
Number of donuts eaten 12.814 13.144 6.324
Posted price of bagel (nominal $) 0.828 0.107 0.069
Posted price of donuts (nominal $) 0.506 0.023 0.020
Payment rate 0.894 0.118 0.108
Marginal cost of bagel (nominal $) 0.273 0.060 0.035
Marginal cost of donut (nominal $) 0.219 0.017 0.015
Year 1998.941 3.718 2.154
Notes: The unit of observation is a delivery. Data reﬂect 80,044 deliveries over the period 1993–2005.
The payment rate is the fraction of the posted price that the company actually receives on the honor system. The marginal cost is the wholesale price of a
bagel or donut. The ﬁnal column presents the standard deviation of the variables within a particular customer over time. See the data appendix for a more
detailed description of the data set and its construction.
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very high quality, but required some cleaning, the details of which are described in the Data Appendix.
In spite of the richness of the data, there are dimensions along which the information available is limited. First, because
the payments are deposited into a single lock box for each customer, it is not possible to observe how much individual
customers pay for their goods. Payment rates may, for instance, vary across bagels and donuts, or vary with the number of
goods remaining uneaten. Second, the data do not include any information on the variety of bagel (e.g. plain, poppy seed,
etc.) or donuts delivered or left uneaten. Consequently, I am unable to investigate questions related to the choice of
product variety.
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the data set. The unit of observation is a delivery to a particular ofﬁce on a speciﬁc
day.8 The table presents means, overall standard deviations, and within-ofﬁce standard deviations over time. Because vir-
tually all of the analysis performed are concerned with decisions at a single point in time, prices used in the paper are in
nominal dollars, except where otherwise noted. There are a total of 80,044 deliveries, with an average of approximately 30
bagels and 14 donuts per delivery. More than 90% of the bagels and donuts delivered are actually eaten.
The nominal price customers are charged for bagels changes three times over the course of the sample. Initially, the
nominal price for a bagel (which comes with cream cheese) was 60 cents. That price jumped to 75 cents in August 1993, 85
cents in August 1988, and $1.00 in May 2003. The nominal price of donuts is 50 cents over almost the entire sample,
increasing to 60 cents in March 2005. In real terms, the price of bagels in 2005 dollars varies between a low of roughly 80
cents at the beginning of the sample before the ﬁrst price increase and a high of slightly more than a dollar after the last
price change. The real price of bagels slowly falls from about 70 cents at the beginning of the sample to roughly 50 cents
over the sample period due to inﬂation, before rising to 60 cents after the price change. The nominal price of donuts is 50
cents over almost the entire sample, increasing to 60 cents in March 2005. In real terms, the price of bagels in 2005 dollars
varies between a low of roughly 80 cents at the beginning of the sample before the ﬁrst price increase and a high of slightly
more than a dollar after the last price change. The real price of bagels slowly falls from about 70 cents at the beginning of the
sample to roughly 50 cents over the sample period due to inﬂation, before rising to 60 cents after the price change.
Because payments are made on the honor system, the ﬁrm's revenue is less than the posted price. On average, the
payment rate (deﬁned as actual revenue divided by expected revenue if the posted prices were paid for each good con-
sumed) is slightly below 90% in the data.
The marginal cost of delivering one more bagel or donut to an existing customer is simply the wholesale cost. The
wholesale cost of a bagel (including cream cheese) rises steadily over the period from 20 cents to 37 cents. The wholesale
cost of a donut is near 20 cents for most of the sample, but is slightly higher in the late 1990s, peaking at 26 cents in 2000.
The wholesale cost per unit is constant over relevant quantity ranges at a given point in time.
Fig. 1 presents monthly time-series data on the total number of bagels and donuts delivered. Donuts represent an
increasing share of the product mix over time. At the beginning of the sample, bagels represented more than 80% of the sales
in both units and revenues. By the end of the data, the number of bagels and donuts sold are nearly equal, although due to
changes in the relative prices charged, bagels continued to account for 70% of revenues. A clear seasonal pattern emerges in
the time-series, December deliveries are always low.7 The data for 1993–1996 were also available only in hard copy, but were scanned or hand entered.
8 In cases where deliveries are made to multiple ﬂoors of an ofﬁce building housing employees of the same company, the ﬁrm treats these as separate
deliveries and I follow that practice as well.
Fig. 1. Aggregate quantities delivered and eaten.
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Conditional on the set of products offered and the ofﬁces to which the company delivers, the two basic choices the ﬁrm
faces are the prices to charge and the quantity of bagels and donuts to deliver to a particular ofﬁce on a given day. In
modeling these choices, I will assume that price is taken as ﬁxed in the short run, with the quantity delivered (which is akin
to capacity) adjusted on a daily basis in response to anticipated ﬂuctuations in demand. Given that there are only four price
changes in the 13 years of my sample, this appears to be an accurate reﬂection of how the company operates. The ﬁrm's
decision is an application of the “newsboy” problem, in which a company must commit to choosing an inventory before
uncertainty in demand is resolved (Mills, 1959; Carlton, 1978; Dana, 2001; Deneckere and Peck, 1995).
Deﬁning notation, let XB and XD represent the quantity of bagels and donuts delivered respectively. Bagels are assumed to be
homogeneous, as are donuts. This ignores the fact that consumer preferences may vary across different varieties of bagels (e.g.
plain versus pumpernickel) or donuts. PB and PD are the posted prices of the two goods to the consumers. Because the goods are
sold on an honor system, the price a consumer pays need not equal the posted price. I deﬁne the parameter θ as the fraction of
the posted price that the company actually receives from a sale taking into account shirking on the honor system. Throughout
the analysis, I will assume that the marginal payment rate θ is identical for bagels and donuts, and that the marginal payment
rate is equal to the average payment rate (i.e. the marginal consumer is as honest as the average consumer).9 Consistent with the
data, I will also assume that at the posted price and marginal payment rate, the revenue from the sale of the good exceeds the
marginal cost (denoted CB and CD respectively). The ﬁrm's marginal cost of increasing the quantity delivered to an existing
customer is constant and equal to the wholesale price of the good delivered. F is the ﬁxed cost of the delivery. The ﬁrm
maximizes expected proﬁts.
Demand for the goods is characterized as follows. Consider ﬁrst the case where the ﬁrm delivers bagels and donuts in
sufﬁcient quantities such that every consumer's demand for each of the products at a given price is satisﬁed. There will be a
demand for each product, denoted Nb and Nd respectively for bagels and donuts. If instead the ﬁrm only delivered one of the9 The results in Levitt (2006) suggest that the marginal payment rate may be a bit below the average payment rate and that buyers of donuts pay a
slightly smaller fraction of the posted price. If this is true, the empirical results that follow will slightly overstate the proﬁtability of the marginal unit of
product delivered, particularly for donuts.
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will be greater when the other product is not available as long as bagels and donuts are substitutes. The quantity of bagels
demanded at the ﬁxed price when no donuts are available is denoted as N  db and the quantity of donuts consumed when no
bagels are available is denoted as N  bd .
If demand for one of the goods at a particular ofﬁce on a given day exceeds the quantity delivered of that good, I assume
that the good in short supply is rationed randomly among the consumers demanding the good.10 This assumption implies
that the ﬁrm is not able to price discriminate between those consumers who will substitute towards the other good in case
of a shortfall of their preferred product and those who will not. Thus, the residual demand for bagels is given by
NbþðNdXdÞ N
 d
b Nb
Nd
 
for NdZXd and
Nb for NdoXd
ð1Þ
A parallel expression holds for donuts. The term inside the ﬁrst set of parentheses in the ﬁrst line of Eq. (1) is the excess
demand for donuts given prices and the number of donuts delivered. The expression in the second set of parentheses is the
number of extra bagels sold when the number of donuts delivered falls by one. (The numerator of that expression is the
increase in bagel demand going from the case where no donuts are supplied to the situation where all donut demand is
satisﬁed; the denominator scales it in terms of donuts.)
The degree of cannibalization between bagels and donuts, N
 d
b Nb
Nd
, appears repeatedly throughout the analysis. To
simplify notation going forward, I will deﬁne λbd  N
 d
b Nb
Nd
, and likewise, let λdb  N
 b
d Nd
Nb
represents the number of extra
donuts demanded when one less bagel is delivered.3.1. The decision problem when demand is known with certainty
I begin with the simplest case in which the ﬁrm knows with certainty Nb, Nd,N
 d
b , and N
 b
d for a particular customer.
11
The ﬁrm's optimal decision boils down to a choice of one of three possible strategies: (1) bring both bagels and donuts and
exactly meet the demand for each good by supplying Nb and Nd respectively, (2) only bring bagels and deliver N
 d
b of them,
or (3) only bring N  bd donuts. Because the ﬁrm is assumed unable to price discriminate between consumers who do
substitute and those who do not, there is no middle ground in which the ﬁrm elects to deliver a small quantity of one good –
the same tradeoff exists between bagels and donuts when going from supplying zero to one donuts or from Nd1 to Nd
donuts. Thus, either it is optimal to fully satisfy the ﬁrst choices of the consumers, or to bring only one of the goods.
Formally, the ﬁrm chooses to bring both bagels and donuts unless λbd4θPDCDθPBCB , in which case bringing only bagels is optimal,
or λdb4 θPBCBθPDCD, in which case delivering only donuts is optimal. The terms on the left-hand side of these expressions reﬂect
the degree of substitutability between the two goods. The terms on the right-hand side are the ratios of the markups. When
one good has a much higher markup and consumption between the two is highly substitutable, delivering none of the low
markup good will is optimal. Each unit of the low markup good sold generates less proﬁt than is lost because fewer of the
high markup good are sold. Empirically, for the parameters I estimate from the available data, the degree of substitutability
between bagels and donuts is well below the threshold that makes it more proﬁtable to deliver only the high markup good
(bagels). Delivering both bagels and donuts, as the ﬁrm does to most customers, appears to be the more proﬁtable strategy.3.2. The decision problem when demand is uncertain
When demand is not known with certainty, the choice of optimal quantities to deliver of each good becomes more
difﬁcult. Because the goods are substitutes the residual demand for each good is a function not only of demand shocks for
that good, but also is indirectly affected by demand shocks for the other good and the quantity delivered of the other good,
due to stock outs. Khouja et al. (1996) demonstrate the difﬁculty of solving this problem explicitly, resorting to Monte Carlo
characterizations because an analytical solution proves elusive.
In light of these difﬁculties, I follow a different path, which is to limit my focus to the ﬁrst order conditions which hold at
the optimum, rather than trying to solve explicitly for quantities. These ﬁrst order conditions are expressed in terms of the
probability that the last bagel or donut delivered is eaten, rather than in terms of absolute numbers of the product eaten and
delivered. This approach provides an indirect test of optimizing behavior that is much less demanding of the data and does
not require the imposition of arbitrary functional form assumptions.10 In practice, consumers may alter their behavior in ways that make this assumption unrealistic. If consumers who preferences run bagels, nothing,
donuts gain more from consuming a bagel than those whose preferences are bagels, donuts, nothing (because the latter group may still get a donut even if
no bagels remain), then the former set of consumers may be more likely to show up early to ensure they obtain a bagel, for instance.
11 Because the ﬁrm faces constant marginal costs and because demand spillovers across ofﬁces are unlikely, the optimal quantity decision for each
customer can be made without reference to the circumstances of other customers.
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To begin, take the simple case in which there is only one product, say bagels. At the proﬁt maximizing point, the marginal
cost of providing one bagel (CB ) must exactly offset the expected marginal revenue it generates, which is given by
θPB  PrðN  db XbZ0Þ. The expected marginal revenue is the incremental revenue when the bagel is sold, θPB (remember
that the ﬁrm does not receive the full posted price, but rather, that price scaled by the average amount of shirking), mul-
tiplied by the probability that the last bagel delivered is eaten. Expressed in terms of the ﬁrm's choice variable, which is the
number of bagels to deliver (XB), the ﬁrst order condition for proﬁt maximization is
PrðLast bagel eaten jXB;N  db Þ ¼
CB
θPB
: ð2Þ
The greater the markup over the marginal cost, the lower is the equilibrium probability that the last unit of the good
supplied will be purchased.12 Note that the earlier assumption that price is ﬁxed is still being maintained.
3.4. Uncertain demand with two products
In the one product case, the consumer faces a choice between buying the product or not. With the introduction of a
second good, one must take into account substitution across products. When attempting to derive an explicit solution for
the optimal quantities, the addition of a second good dramatically increases the complexity of the problem, as demonstrated
in Khouja et al. (1996). Analyzed in terms of ﬁrst-order conditions, however, introducing a second good is relatively
straightforward. Take the case of determining the ﬁrst-order condition for bagels, holding ﬁxed the number of donuts
delivered. There are four different regimes to consider, each corresponding to whether, at the current choice of delivery
quantities, there is excess supply or excess demand for each of the goods.13 If there is excess demand for both bagels and
donuts (i.e. both stock out), then cross-good substitution is not a concern when adding an additional bagel. The extra bagel
may lead a consumer who prefers bagels over donuts to switch her purchase from a donut to a bagel, but that donut will be
taken by another customer because there is unsatisﬁed demand for donuts. Similarly, if there is excess demand for donuts
and an excess supply of bagels, bringing an extra bagel will not affect the consumption of donuts. There are already excess
bagels, so bringing one more bagel should have no impact on anyone's consumption; the last bagel will simply go uneaten
with certainty and nothing else will change. Similarly, if there is excess supply of both bagels and donuts, bringing an extra
bagel will have no impact on either bagel or donut consumption. The extra bagel will once again go uneaten. Thus, in three
of the four regimes, substitution away from donuts towards bagels is not an issue. In those regimes, the same ﬁrst order
condition that was present in the one-good case continues to hold in the two-good case.
The only case in which the marginal bagel inﬂuences the quantity of donuts consumed is when there is excess supply of
donuts and excess demand for bagels. In that case, if the consumer who chooses the last bagel switches away from a donut
to purchase that bagel, the number of uneaten donuts will increase by one. Using the notation and assumptions introduced
above, the probability that the consumer who consumes the last bagel switches off of a donut is equal to λdb. When such a
switch occurs, the ﬁrm earns the revenue associated with selling the marginal bagel, but sacriﬁces the revenue from the lost
donut sale. The only difference between the ﬁrst-order condition in the two-good case and the one-good case is that this
substitution across goods leads to an additional term in the two-good case, but only when the ﬁrm is in the fourth regime
where there is excess demand for bagels and excess supply of donuts:
Prðlast bagel eatenÞ ¼ CB
θPB
þλdb
PD
PB
 Prðlast bagel eaten; last donut not eatenÞ ð3Þ
where λdb is the degree of substitution to donuts from bagels. The term after the addition sign on the right-hand side of the
equation is the foregone revenue from lost donut sales due to bringing one extra bagel.1412 See, Hadley and Whitin (1963) for a more general characterization of these ﬁrst order conditions allowing for other considerations such as a non-
zero salvage value of unsold products or good will losses associated with stock-outs. Note that (except in extreme cases such as positive feedback effects)
the conditional probability of the last bagel being eaten is (weakly) declining with the number of bagels delivered; if there are two delivery quantities that
satisfy Eq. (2), the greater of these maximizes proﬁts.
Another point worth noting is that I have assumed that all bagels are identical, whereas in practice there is heterogeneity (e.g., poppy vs. plain bagel).
Even if a poppy bagel goes uneaten, if the ﬁrm had brought one extra plain bagel, that plain bagel may have been consumed. Product heterogeneity will
thus bias me towards concluding that the ﬁrm is delivering too many bagels and donuts when indeed the ﬁrm might be choosing optimally (and similarly,
to possibly argue that the ﬁrm is choosing quantity optimally, when in fact they are delivering too few).
Ideally, we would like to observe not just the presence of a stock out, but also the time at which the stock-out occurred. Unfortunately, the data do not
contain such information.
13 In the discussion that follows, I ignore the fact that donuts and bagels come in discrete units, as opposed to varying continuously. Near the margins
of the four regimes, of course, the discreteness can push the ﬁrm from one regime to another, but these changes are of second order importance in solving
the problem.
14 I limit my derivation of Eq. (3) to an informal discussion in the text. Readers interested in a more formal proof are directed to Eq. (1) of Khouja et al.
(1996), which presents the proﬁt function for a two-item newsboy problem with substitution. Assigning a salvage value of zero for leftover bagels and
donuts, taking the ﬁrst-order condition of Eq. (1) (Khouja et al., 1996), setting that ﬁrst-order condition equal to zero, and rearranging terms, yields my Eq.
(3).
Table 2
Estimated proﬁtability of the last bagel delivered when bagels are the only product delivered.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Year Average
posted price
of bagel
Marginal
cost of bagel
Payment rate Probability all
but one bagel
eaten
Probability all
bagels eaten
Expected proﬁt
from next to last
bagel delivered
Expected proﬁt
from last bagel
delivered
Expected proﬁt if
one extra bagel
had been
delivered
1993 0.646 0.210 0.926 0.489 0.365 0.083 0.009 0.047
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
1994 0.750 0.200 0.914 0.438 0.315 0.101 0.016 0.044
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
1995 0.750 0.202 0.909 0.466 0.347 0.116 0.035 0.026
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
1996 0.750 0.211 0.908 0.448 0.307 0.094 0.002 0.068
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
1997 0.750 0.221 0.901 0.438 0.320 0.075 0.005 0.063
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
1998 0.785 0.253 0.896 0.448 0.339 0.062 0.015 0.073
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008)
1999 0.850 0.282 0.904 0.578 0.436 0.162 0.053 0.029
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
2000 0.850 0.294 0.919 0.625 0.458 0.195 0.064 0.032
(0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
2001 0.850 0.307 0.901 0.633 0.475 0.178 0.057 0.033
(0.012) (0.013) (0.015)
2002 0.850 0.301 0.903 0.583 0.421 0.146 0.022 0.068
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
2003 0.950 0.334 0.893 0.494 0.324 0.085 0.059 0.154
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014)
2004 1.000 0.369 0.883 0.558 0.379 0.123 0.034 0.141
(0.021) (0.020) (0.023)
2005 1.000 0.373 0.863 0.578 0.375 0.126 0.049 0.163
(0.017) (0.017) (0.018)
Average
over all
years
0.784 0.246 0.906 0.497 0.361 0.107 0.011 0.059
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Note: Each row corresponds to average values for all deliveries in the listed calendar year for customers receiving bagels only.
Columns (1) through (5) are observed in the data. Columns (6) through (8) are estimates using Eq. (1) of the paper to compute the expected proﬁt from the
next to last bagel delivered, the last bagel delivered, and if one extra bagel was delivered.
Standard errors (in parentheses below the estimates) are calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap with one thousand replications.
Column (8) is calculated under the assumption that the likelihood that the Nþ1 bagel is eaten conditional on the Nth being eaten is equal to the probability
the Nth was eaten conditional on the N1 bagel being eaten.
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equilibrium probability that the last bagel will be eaten is (weakly) higher when both goods are delivered. This implies a
reduction in the number of bagels delivered when both goods are offered. This is true not only because demand for bagels
falls when donuts are offered, but also because increases in bagel sales lead to foregone revenue associated with canni-
balizing donut sales on the margin. The only cases in which the probability the last bagel eaten is the same across the two
situations is when there is no substitution between the products, or when there is never simultaneously a shortage of bagels
and an excess supply of donuts.15
The corresponding ﬁrst order condition for donuts is identical to that of bagels, except that the roles of bagels and donuts
have been reversed:
Prðlast donut eatenÞ ¼ CD
θPD
þλbd
PB
PD
 Prðlast donut eaten; last bagel not eatenÞ: ð4Þ
Empirically, bagels are the more expensive good and carry a larger markup. Comparing Eqs. (3) and (4), the term before
the addition sign pushes towards bagels stocking out less frequently than donuts. In the term after the addition sign, both
the higher price of bagels, and the probability term reinforce the tendency for donuts to stock out. Therefore, for reasonable
values of the rate of substitution from bagels to donuts and vice-versa, therefore, the likelihood that donuts stock out will
exceed that of bagels stocking out.15 In the case of perfectly correlated demand shocks for bagels and donuts, for instance, it can be shown that donuts will always stock out before bagels
(which have a higher markup).
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The ﬁrm's price decision is standard: it wants to price such that marginal cost equals marginal revenue, following the
usual inverse elasticity rule of choosing markups. To the extent that the two goods are substitutes or complements in
demand, the pricing decision should also take into account spillovers across the two goods.4. Testing for proﬁt maximization in the choice of quantities
Detailed data, combined with the straightforward nature of this company's business, provide an unusually direct
opportunity to test for proﬁt maximizing behavior on the part of the ﬁrm along two important dimensions of decision
making: the choice of quantity and the choice of price. In this section I explore the choice of quantity to deliver.
4.1. The quantity decision when only one product is delivered
A subset of the customers to which the company delivers receive no donuts, only bagels. When only a single product is
delivered, Eq. (1) captures the ﬁrst-order conditions governing the optimal quantity to deliver conditional on a particular
price. The determinants of the optimal quantity choice are the posted price of a bagel, the degree of underpayment on the
honor system, the marginal cost, and the observed probability that all the bagels delivered are eaten. All of these factors are
either known, or can be readily computed from the available data.
Table 2 analyzes the degree to which the ﬁrm's actions, on average over the course of a year, correspond to the prediction
in Eq. (1).16 Each row of the table corresponds to a different year's data. The ﬁrst ﬁve columns report the means of the ﬁve
factors that enter into the ﬁrst-order condition. Based on those data, columns 6–8 present the estimated proﬁt generated
from the penultimate bagel delivered, the last bagel delivered, and the predicted proﬁt had one extra bagel been delivered.17
Standard errors, computed using a nonparametric bootstrap, are shown in parentheses. If the ﬁrm is optimizing with respect
to quantity delivered, the proﬁt on the last bagel should be close to zero. By extension of that same logic, there should be
positive proﬁt associated with the next-to-last bagel, and losses associated with bringing one extra bagel. The results
reported in Table 2 demonstrate that the ﬁrm's quantity choices correspond closely with the predictions of the model.
Averaged over the whole sample, the expected proﬁt on the last bagel delivered is 1.1 cents.18 This estimate has small
standard errors, as do the others in the table. Given marginal costs, prices, and the payment rate, the probability that all
bagels are eaten that sets the proﬁt of the last bagel to zero is .345. The actual value observed in the data is .36. Across years,
the estimated proﬁt on the last bagel delivered ranges from 5.9 cents to 6.4 cents.
Comparing the expected proﬁt on the last bagel delivered to that of the penultimate and Nþ1 bagel provides a further
measure of the ﬁrm's choice of quantity.
Columns 6 and 8 of Table 2 present estimates of the expected proﬁt associated with the N1 bagel and the Nþ1 bagel. In
column 6, the next-to-last bagel yields positive proﬁts in all years, averaging between 10 and 11 cents over the entire
sample. Thus, although there are a few years (especially in recent times) in which the last bagel delivered has a negative
impact on proﬁts, there are no years in which the company would want to reduce average delivery size by more than one
bagel. Because there are relatively few customers who receive only bagels and the loss on the last bagel is small, these
deviations from the optimal quantity have a minimal impact on the bottom line. Had the company lowered bagel deliveries
by one to all clients in the years of the sample in which the last bagel delivered returned negative proﬁts, the total increase
in proﬁt would be less than $200 combined.
The hypothetical proﬁt associated with delivering one extra bagel, shown in column 8, is consistently negative, pro-
ducing a loss of roughly 6 cents on average. There are no years in which the ﬁrm could have increased proﬁts through an16 In this ﬁrst initial analysis of the data I aggregate across customers because all of the components going into the test of ﬁrst order conditions are
constant across ﬁrms at a given point in time. Later in the paper I analyze whether including observable characteristics of ﬁrms and their consumption
histories can improve the quantity decisions of the bagel company.
17 For a hypothetical increase in the number of bagels delivered from N to Nþ1, additional assumptions are necessary since in the data I only observe
whether N bagels were eaten, but what is needed for this estimate is the probability that the Nþ1 bagel will be eaten. One way to approximate that
probability is to compute the likelihood that the Nth bagel will be eaten, conditional on bagel N1 being eaten, and to multiply that number by the
probability that the Nth bagel is eaten. This value is observed in the data, and among customers receiving only bagels, the likelihood that the Nth bagel is
consumed given that the N1 bagel is eaten is roughly 73% over the course of the sample, with a high of 75.8% in 1998 and a low of 65.6% in 2003. Those
numbers are likely to be upper bounds on the likelihood that the Nþ1 donut is eaten given that donut N is eaten. By using this overly optimistic number in
my hypothetical calculations, I overstate the true proﬁtability of increasing bagel quantities, making it easier to reject that the ﬁrm actually took the correct
action on average in a year. It is also possible, however, that the likelihood the Nþ1 donut is eaten with a higher probability than is given by my
assumption. For instance, if at a particular ofﬁce demand comes in discrete clumps (i.e. either 10 donuts eaten or 20, but never in between), then the
probability that the 11th donut gets eaten is identical to the probability that the 12th donut gets eaten, not declining as I assume. It is also possible (but
probably unlikely), that the probability that the Nþ1 donut is eaten conditional on N donuts being eaten rises with the number of donuts delivered if there
are positive feedback effects (e.g. each extra person standing around the table eating a donut attracts more than one additional consumers to buy a donut).
18 The average revenue from a bagel in the sample, taking into account a payment rate less than 1, is 64.1 cents. The marginal cost of a bagel, averaged
over the sample, is 24.4 cents. So if the last bagel delivered were eatenwith certainty, the marginal proﬁt on that bagel would be 39.7 cents. If the last bagel
delivered was never eaten the proﬁt would be 24.4 cents.
Table 3
Estimates of the cannibalization rate across products.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Number of bagels delivered is unchanged and... Number of donuts delivered is unchanged and...
Donuts delivered
unchanged
Donuts deliv-
ered increases
Donuts deliv-
ered decreases
Bagels delivered
unchanged
Bagels delivered
increases
Bagels delivered
decreases
Change in:
Donuts delivered 0.000 4.369 4.250 0.000 0.000 0.000
Bagels delivered 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 2.922 3.315
Donuts eaten 0.088 3.272 1.997 0.088 0.328 0.060
Bagels eaten 0.169 0.678 0.150 0.169 0.865 0.522
Implied cannibalization rate:
(diffs-in-diffs using column
1 as control)
From delivering one more
donut
– 0.151 0.167 – – –
From delivering one more
bagel
– – – – 0.232 0.419
Notes: Estimates in the table are mean changes in donuts and bagels delivered and eaten from one delivery to a client to the next when the quantity
delivered of at least one of the products is unchanged across the two deliveries.
In columns (1) and (4), both quantities delivered remain constant. In columns (2) and (3) only the number of donuts delivered changes. In columns (5) and
(6) only the number of bagels delivered changes. The bottom two rows of the table present the implied cannibalization rates, using the results in column
(1) as the baseline.
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bagels to deliver when that is the only product delivered.
4.2. The quantity decision when both bagels and donuts are delivered
The optimal quantity decision becomes more difﬁcult when two products are delivered rather than one. Now, in addition
to the other factors that enter the ﬁrst-order conditions in the one-good case, the probability that each of the goods stocks
out, and the degree of cannibalization across the two goods become relevant. The stock-out rates are readily observed in the
data. The degree of cannibalization across the two goods is not directly observable and must be estimated.
The ideal setting for estimating the substitution from donuts to bagels would be a randomized experiment in which the
researcher systematically varies the number of donuts delivered, and then measures the change in consumption of both
donuts and bagels. Likewise, one would want to induce random variation in the number of bagels delivered to identify the
extent of cannibalization of donuts by bagels.
Unfortunately, this sort of randomization is not present in the data. The observed ﬂuctuations in quantities delivered are
clearly not exogenous. The company increases the number of bagels delivered when anticipated demand for bagels is high.
To the extent that demand shocks for the two goods are positively correlated, demand for donuts will generally be higher
when there is a large delivery of bagels than when the delivery is small. In practice, estimates of the cannibalization rates for
these two goods are biased toward zero due to observed variation in the data.
As a crude proxy for the degree of cannibalization, I compare changes in the number of bagels and donuts consumed
from one delivery to the next at a client for those cases where the quantity delivered of one good remains constant, but the
quantity of the other good does not.19 I measure cannibalization of bagels by donuts as follows:
λbd ¼
ΔðBagels_eatenÞ
ΔðDonuts_eatenÞ ΔXb ¼ 0; ΔXda0

where Δ reﬂects the change from one week to the next at a given customer. If, in response to six extra donuts being
delivered, four more donuts and one fewer bagels are eaten, I would estimate a cannibalization effect on bagels by donuts of
 .25. The formula for cannibalization of donuts by bagels is identical, except with the values for bagels and donuts reversed
in the equation.
Focusing on cases where the quantity delivered of one good remains constant has two beneﬁts. First, in the case of stock
outs of that good, the truncation point remains the same in both weeks, facilitating comparisons of the quantity demanded.19 One institutional factor that aids in this estimation is that the ﬁrm almost always delivers donuts in multiples of six. Because of the lumpiness of the
delivery quantity, small changes in perceived demand may lead to discrete jumps in donuts delivered, as implied by the standard sS model, somewhat
mitigating the issues raised by endogeneity of the delivery size. For bagels, however, this lumpiness is not present.
Table 4
Estimated proﬁtability of the last bagel eaten (when both products delivered).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year Average
posted
price of
bagel
Marginal
cost of
bagel
Payment rate Probability all
but one bagel
eaten
Probability
all bagels
eaten
Probability all
bagels eaten
and excess of
donuts
Expected
proﬁt from
next to last
bagel
delivered
Expected
proﬁt from
last bagel
delivered
Expected
proﬁt if one
extra bagel
had been
delivered
1993 0.647 0.210 0.908 0.456 0.365 0.052 0.047 0.003 0.043
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
1994 0.750 0.200 0.894 0.426 0.328 0.052 0.074 0.012 0.036
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1995 0.750 0.202 0.888 0.466 0.354 0.049 0.097 0.027 0.027
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1996 0.750 0.211 0.884 0.472 0.354 0.056 0.088 0.016 0.040
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
1997 0.750 0.221 0.882 0.463 0.358 0.058 0.074 0.008 0.043
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
1998 0.787 0.253 0.874 0.469 0.360 0.069 0.055 0.015 0.070
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
1999 0.850 0.282 0.883 0.563 0.430 0.114 0.117 0.024 0.047
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
2000 0.850 0.294 0.882 0.634 0.487 0.127 0.154 0.053 0.025
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
2001 0.850 0.307 0.880 0.605 0.447 0.151 0.112 0.006 0.073
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
2002 0.850 0.301 0.900 0.560 0.411 0.132 0.097 0.006 0.083
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
2003 0.954 0.334 0.894 0.522 0.373 0.109 0.086 0.031 0.116
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
2004 1.000 0.369 0.893 0.585 0.412 0.131 0.122 0.020 0.122
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
2005 1.000 0.373 0.902 0.575 0.405 0.160 0.103 0.035 0.134
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Average
over all
years
0.843 0.281 0.890 0.530 0.395 0.101 0.093 0.000 0.070
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Note: Each row corresponds to average values for all deliveries in the listed calendar year for customers receiving both bagels and donuts.
Columns (1) through (6) are observed in the data. Columns (7) through (9) are estimates using Eq. (2) of the paper to compute the expected proﬁt from the
next to last bagel delivered, the last bagel delivered, and if one extra bagel were delivered. These estimates use the cannibalization estimates obtained in
Table 3. Standard errors (in parentheses below the estimates) are calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap with one thousand replications. Column (9) is
calculated under the assumption that the likelihood that the Nþ1 bagel is eaten conditional on the Nth being eaten is equal to the probability the Nth was
eaten conditional on the N1 bagel being eaten.
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ﬂuctuation in demand relative to the previous week (although if they deliver more of the other good it does suggest that
they are relatively optimistic).
The results on cannibalization across products are presented in Table 3. The ﬁrst column shows the changes in bagels and
donuts consumed in cases in which there is no change from the prior week in the number of bagels and donuts delivered: the
number of bagels eaten falls by .169 and the number of donuts eaten is reduced by .088. These changes will serve as the
counterfactual as to what would be expected had the quantities delivered not changed. Columns 2 and 3 present results when
the number of donuts delivered changes and bagels delivered remains constant. Column 2 reﬂects cases where donuts
delivered increase; column 3 has decreases in delivered donuts. In those instances when donut deliveries rise, the increase in
the number of donuts delivered is 4.37, with 3.27 of those extra donuts eaten. Bagel consumption falls by .68. Relative to the
counterfactual in column 1, an extra 3.36 donuts are eaten, and bagels consumed fall by .509. This implies that each extra
donut eaten cannibalizes .151 bagel sales. In column 3, the number of donuts delivered declines, leading to approximately two
fewer donuts eaten and an extra .15 bagels consumed. Compared to the counterfactual in column 1, donuts consumed fall by
1.91 and bagels eaten rise by .319, for an implied cannibalization rate of .167, nearly identical to the parallel ﬁgure for Column 2.
Columns 5 and 6 show the results when the number of bagels varies, with donut quantities held constant. When more
bagels are delivered, an extra .865 bagels are eaten, and .328 fewer donuts. Relative to the column 4 counterfactual, bagels
consumed rise by 1.034 and a .24 reduction in donuts, implying a cannibalization rate of .232. When fewer bagels are
delivered, bagels eaten fall by .522, with an increase of .060 donuts. Compared to the counterfactual, this is a decline of .353
bagels and a .148 rise in donuts, for a cannibalization rate of .419 – substantially larger than implied by the results in column 5.
Table 5
Estimated proﬁtability of the last donut eaten (when both products delivered).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Year Average
posted
price of
donut
Marginal
cost of
donut
Payment rate Probability all
but one donut
eaten
Probability
all donuts
eaten
Probability all
donuts eaten
and excess of
bagels
Expected
proﬁt from
next to last
donut
delivered
Expected
proﬁt from
last donut
delivered
Expected
proﬁt if one
extra donut
had been
delivered
1993 0.500 0.204 0.908 0.853 0.723 0.410 0.136 0.086 0.044
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
1994 0.500 0.214 0.894 0.840 0.700 0.425 0.105 0.054 0.011
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
1995 0.500 0.215 0.888 0.841 0.695 0.389 0.105 0.052 0.008
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
1996 0.500 0.224 0.884 0.822 0.670 0.372 0.087 0.033 0.013
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
1997 0.500 0.228 0.882 0.853 0.703 0.402 0.093 0.039 0.006
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
1998 0.500 0.227 0.874 0.832 0.670 0.379 0.082 0.024 0.023
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
1999 0.500 0.229 0.883 0.777 0.615 0.299 0.066 0.007 0.041
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
2000 0.500 0.263 0.882 0.756 0.605 0.245 0.030 0.025 0.070
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
2001 0.500 0.197 0.880 0.653 0.512 0.216 0.054 0.003 0.039
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
2002 0.500 0.197 0.900 0.660 0.520 0.241 0.059 0.008 0.033
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
2003 0.500 0.211 0.894 0.676 0.545 0.281 0.040 0.006 0.043
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
2004 0.500 0.209 0.893 0.692 0.553 0.272 0.048 0.001 0.041
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
2005 0.575 0.225 0.902 0.630 0.471 0.227 0.055 0.013 0.065
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Average
over all
years
0.507 0.219 0.890 0.751 0.605 0.311 0.070 0.017 0.027
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Note: Each row corresponds to average values for all deliveries in the listed calendar year for customers receiving both bagels and donuts.
Columns (1) through (6) are observed in the data. Columns (7) through (9) are estimates using Eq. (3) of the paper to compute the expected proﬁt from the
next to last donut delivered, the last donut delivered, and if one extra donut were delivered. These estimates use the cannibalization estimates obtained in
Table 3. Standard errors (in parentheses below the estimates) are calculated using a nonparametric bootstrap with one thousand replications. Column (9) is
calculated under the assumption that the likelihood that the Nþ1 donut is eaten conditional on the Nth being eaten is equal to the probability the Nth was
eaten conditional on the N1 donut being eaten.
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direction. Thus, I assume that each extra donut eaten lowers bagels eaten by .159, and that the cannibalization rate in the
other direction is .325.20
Table 4 reports the results on the estimated proﬁtability of the last bagel delivered for customers who receive both bagels
and donuts using Eq. (2). For purposes of comparison, I also report the implied proﬁtability of the N1 and Nþ1 bagel
delivered, based on the same assumptions used in Table 2. As was true for clients who received only bagels, the ﬁrm does an
outstanding job of choosing the quantity of bagels for customers who receive both products. On average across the entire
sample, the ﬁrm earns a zero proﬁt from the last bagel delivered. In six of the thirteen years, including the last four years, the
last bagel delivered had a negative proﬁt expectation, although in even the worst year the loss was less than four cents.
There are no years in which the company could have improved proﬁts by lowering bagel deliveries by more than one per
customer (i.e. the proﬁts of the next to last bagel is always positive) or by increasing bagel deliveries across the board (i.e.
the expected proﬁt of the Nþ1 bagel is always negative).
Because the markup on bagels is greater than that of donuts, bagel stock-outs occur less frequently than donut stock-
outs. As a consequence, it is relatively rare that all bagels are consumed, but donuts remain uneaten; this occurs between
5 and 16% of the time depending on the year. The infrequency of this circumstance coupled with the relatively low proﬁt
margin on donuts means that cannibalization considerations are of minor importance in the choice of bagel quantity.20 The results do not prove to be particularly sensitive to these cannibalization parameters. Assuming no cannibalization, or cannibalization that is
twice as large as assumed here shifts the marginal return on the last bagel delivered up by an average of 1.5 cents (if no cannibalization) or down by that
same amount (if twice the amount of cannibalization). For donuts, the effect is larger: 3.7 cents up or down for the marginal donut.
Table 6
Predicting stock-outs from observable characteristics.
Can regression improve on the company's choices?
Bagels Distribution of uneaten bagels, by regression prediction of degree of shortfall or excess of bagels delivered
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observed number
of bagels left
10% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
surplus
10% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
surplus
Zero 0.520 0.460 0.330 0.261
One 0.125 0.139 0.143 0.126
Two 0.096 0.108 0.124 0.115
Three 0.071 0.085 0.102 0.104
Four 0.049 0.060 0.081 0.083
Five or more 0.139 0.148 0.220 0.311
Expected proﬁt on:
next to last bagel 0.185 0.151 0.059 0.002
last bagel 0.099 0.055 0.039 0.089
extra bagel 0.028 0.020 0.108 0.148
Donuts Distribution of uneaten donuts, by regression prediction of degree of shortfall or excess of donuts delivered
Observed number
of donuts left
10% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
surplus
10% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
surplus
Zero 0.733 0.685 0.496 0.382
One 0.115 0.133 0.165 0.156
Two 0.062 0.073 0.115 0.125
Three 0.039 0.044 0.077 0.094
Four 0.019 0.026 0.051 0.071
Five or more 0.032 0.041 0.096 0.172
Expected proﬁt on:
next to last donut 0.116 0.100 0.036 0.013
last donut 0.073 0.051 0.025 0.070
extra donut 0.036 0.010 0.072 0.112
Predicting stock-outs from observable characteristics (INCLUDES COMPANY FIXED EFFECTS).
Can regression improve on the company's choices?
Bagels Distribution of uneaten bagels, by regression prediction of degree of shortfall or excess of bagels delivered
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Observed number
of bagels left
10% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
surplus
10% of observations with
greatest predicted bagel
surplus
Zero 0.460 0.441 0.347 0.309
One 0.134 0.140 0.142 0.137
Two 0.102 0.107 0.125 0.122
Three 0.077 0.085 0.103 0.103
Four 0.060 0.064 0.078 0.079
Five or more 0.168 0.163 0.206 0.251
Expected proﬁt on:
next to last bagel 0.144 0.137 0.072 0.040
last bagel 0.053 0.040 0.026 0.054
extra bagel 0.019 0.034 0.096 0.120
Donuts Distribution of uneaten donuts, by regression prediction of degree of shortfall or excess of donuts delivered
Observed number
of donuts left
10% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
shortfall
50% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
surplus
10% of observations with
greatest predicted donut
surplus
Zero 0.709 0.664 0.514 0.453
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Table 6 (continued )
Predicting stock-outs from observable characteristics (INCLUDES COMPANY FIXED EFFECTS).
Can regression improve on the company's choices?
Bagels Distribution of uneaten bagels, by regression prediction of degree of shortfall or excess of bagels delivered
(1) (2) (3) (4)
One 0.129 0.140 0.158 0.143
Two 0.063 0.077 0.111 0.117
Three 0.039 0.047 0.074 0.075
Four 0.023 0.028 0.049 0.063
Five or more 0.037 0.044 0.093 0.150
Expected proﬁt on:
next to last donut 0.108 0.094 0.041 0.009
last donut 0.060 0.042 0.017 0.043
extra donut 0.020 0.001 0.062 0.083
Notes: The results in the table report the number of bagels (top panel) and donuts (bottom panel) that go uneaten depending on the predictions of a probit
model designed to improve on the quantity choices of the company. The probit model uses only information observable to the company ex-ante and is
estimated on the prior two calendar years of data and extrapolated out of sample.
Deliveries are rank ordered within a year based on the predicted likelihood of a stockout. Column (1) reports actual bagels uneaten in the 10% of deliveries
predicted to be most likely to stock out.
Columns (2) and (3) are outcomes for deliveries above and below the median predicted stock out.
Column (4) corresponds to the 10% of deliveries predicted to be least likely to stock out.
For each type of good in each column, the estimated proﬁtability of the next to last, last, and one extra donut are reported.
S.D. Levitt / Research in Economics 70 (2016) 518–535530Referring back to Eq. (2), the presence of donuts reduces the optimal probability that the last bagel should be eaten by less
than one percentage point on average.
The ﬁrm exhibits substantial skill in altering its behavior over time to achieve the proﬁt maximizing delivery quantities.
For instance, comparing 1996 and 2001, in both years the ﬁrm earned a small proﬁt on the last bagel delivered. In 1996,
however, the probability the last bagel is eaten is 35.4%, versus almost 45% in 2001. Because the ratio of price to marginal
cost is higher in 1996, the optimal probability that the last bagel eaten is lower, partially offset by the fact that in 2001 it is
more frequently the case that there uneaten donuts available to absorb unsatisﬁed demand when bagels stock out.
Table 5 is identical to Table 4, except that the values reported represent the proﬁt associated with the last donut
delivered instead of the last bagel. The ﬁrm does slightly worse in optimizing donut quantities than it does for bagels early
in the sample, but otherwise chooses the number of donuts extremely well. In the ﬁrst three years of the sample, the ﬁrm
delivers too few donuts, i.e. the expected proﬁt from adding one donut to each delivery is positive. There are four years
(including the last three years) in which the last bagel delivered yields negative returns, implying that the ﬁrm would
increase proﬁt by reducing the quantity delivered. The foregone proﬁts of these slight deviations from the optimal choice of
quantity, however, are trivial: less than $300 total across the whole sample. It is interesting to note that at the end of the
sample, the quantity of both bagels and donuts deliver appear to be too high.
Cannibalization is a much more important concern for donuts than bagels for two reasons. First, it is much more likely
that there are excess bagels when all donuts are eaten then vice versa. Second, there is a larger markup on bagels than on
donuts, so a customer who substitutes a donut for a bagel is costly to the ﬁrm. Substituting the values observed in the data,
cannibalization concerns raise the optimal probability of having the last donut eaten by 3 percentage points on average in
the sample off of a baseline of a little more than 60%.
The estimates in Tables 4 and 5 are averages over all deliveries in a year. It is possible that the ﬁrm does well on average,
but systematically delivers too much product to some clients and too little to others. To investigate this possibility, I estimate
probit regressions in which the dependent variable is equal to one if all bagels are eaten on a particular delivery and zero
otherwise. Explanatory variables include the number of bagels delivered this time as well as in the last two deliveries to this
customer, the number of uneaten bagels in each of the last two deliveries, indicator variables for stock-outs of bagels in the
last two deliveries. Also included are the parallel variables for donut deliveries, as well as year, month, and day of the week
indicators.21 All of the variables in the regression are observable to the company at the time the quantity decision is made.
Using data from the preceding two calendar years, I generate out-of-sample predictions regarding the likelihood of a stock-
out of bagels on each delivery.22 By basing my predictions only on the outcome of prior years of data, I ensure that only
information available to the ﬁrm when making their quantity choice underlies my estimates. I then rank–order observations
within a year with respect to the predicted likelihood of a stock-out. I also carry out a parallel exercise for donut deliveries
including the exact same set of explanatory variables.21 I have experimented with using continuous measures of time as opposed to month dummies, as well as including customer-level ﬁxed effects in the
regressions with little impact on my estimates.
22 Because I require two years of earlier data to carry out this exercise, I do not make predictions for the ﬁrst two years of the sample.
Table 7
Changes in proﬁts and revenue in response to price changes.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
August 31, 1993 August 4, 1998 May 5, 2003 March 28, 2005
Variable Before After P-value Before After P-value Before After P-value Before After P-value
Price of bagel 0.600 0.750 0.750 0.850 0.850 1.000 1.000 1.000
Price of donut 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.600
Marginal cost of bagel 0.210 0.210 0.253 0.253 0.334 0.334 0.373 0.373
Marginal cost of donut 0.204 0.204 0.227 0.227 0.211 0.211 0.225 0.225
Bagels delivered 52.084 49.077 0.000 30.170 28.693 0.000 22.810 22.101 0.000 18.610 18.247 0.059
Bagels eaten 48.884 44.516 0.000 27.091 25.120 0.000 20.540 19.638 0.000 16.857 16.554 0.187
Donuts delivered 12.207 11.758 0.000 10.789 10.405 0.000 17.328 17.514 0.180 16.234 15.792 0.103
Donuts eaten 11.705 11.333 0.008 10.319 9.715 0.000 16.098 16.181 0.623 15.247 13.996 0.000
Payment rate 0.916 0.896 0.004 0.890 0.887 0.625 0.914 0.887 0.003 0.910 0.895 0.105
Total variable cost 13.431 12.758 0.000 9.791 9.825 0.652 11.504 11.480 0.724 10.542 10.322 0.042
Total revenue 32.010 34.626 0.000 22.436 22.952 0.067 23.121 24.293 0.000 22.281 22.274 0.985
Total proﬁt 18.579 21.867 0.000 12.646 13.127 0.053 11.616 12.813 0.000 11.744 11.958 0.468
Note: Results in table are means of the three deliveries immediately preceding and following a price change for all customers who have three such
deliveries in the month before and after the price change. All values are in nominal dollars. The P-values shown are the p-values of a before-period
indicator variable in a regression where the indicator variable and company dummy variables are regressed on the variable of interest.
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a stock-out. Column 1 represents the 10% of cases with my highest predicted likelihood of a stock-out. Column 2 reﬂects the
half of the observations most likely to stock-out. Columns 3 and 4 are the bottom half and bottom 10% of predicted stock-
outs respectively. The rows of the table report what actually happened in terms of leftovers for deliveries in each of these
categories. The top panel presents results for bagels, the second panel corresponds to donuts.
The results in Table 6 demonstrate that the regression model has some power to predict delivery outcomes out of
sample. Bagel stock-outs occur 52.0% of the time versus only 26.1% of the time where the model predicts bagel stock-outs to
be most likely, top panel column (1), and least likely, top panel column (2), respectively. The fact that the probit model is
able to generate systematic out-of-sample predictions means that the ﬁrm is not optimally incorporating all of the available
information into its delivery decisions and could improve its performance using this information.23 The table also reports
the expected proﬁts from the delivery of the N1, N, and Nþ1 bagel or donut within each of the subsets identiﬁed by the
regressions. For the 10% of observations where the probit model predicts the greatest likelihood of a bagel stock-out, it
would have been proﬁtable to deliver one more bagel. For the 50% of deliveries with the lowest stock-out probabilities,
lowering the quantity delivered by one would have increased proﬁts, and for 10% of the sample a reduction of two bagels
would have been improved proﬁts. Overall, the regression model adds only trivially to what the ﬁrm already does. The
increment to proﬁts that would have been associated with incorporating the probit predictions into what the ﬁrm already
was doing is less than $2000 combined over the entire sample.
The probit model identiﬁes slightly greater deviations for donuts, as shown in the bottom panel of Table 6.24 Proﬁts could
have been increased by delivering two more donuts to half of the customers and one or two less to the other half. The
contribution to proﬁts of implementing the model's predictions with respect to donut quantities is approximately $1500
total over the sample.5. Testing for proﬁt maximization in the choice of prices
In contrast to quantities supplied, which vary for each customer on a delivery-by-delivery basis, there is little price
variation. Over the course of 13 years, nominal prices changed on only four occasions, as noted earlier. Bagel prices increased
from 60 to 75 cents on August 31, 1993, from 75 to 85 cents on August 4, 1998, and from 85 cents to one dollar on March 5, of
2003. The price of donuts is 50 cents until March 28, 2005, after which it rises to 60 cents.25 While there is no reason to
believe that the timing of these price jumps were completely exogenous, discussions with the ﬁrm suggest that the price
changes were not precipitated by any perceived discrete shifts in consumer demand.23 Note that this model takes as an input the ﬁrm's choice of quantity to deliver, so the way that the ﬁrm would utilize the model would be to come up
with quantity choices using their current approach, and then adjust quantities on the margin using the model. As a testimony to the skill of the ﬁrm in
choosing quantities, I have been unable to build a model using only previous delivery outcomes that outperforms the ﬁrm's choices.
24 In defense of the ﬁrm's quantity choices, it is worth remembering that the ﬁrm delivers in increments of six donuts, whereas this analysis assumes
that the ﬁrm can costlessly vary the quantity delivered by any discrete number of units.
25 According to the founder of the ﬁrm, the price increases were related to changes in costs and the perception that the prices they were charging were
lower than competitors, such as Dunkin Donuts. His choice of prices was not constrained by agreements with ofﬁce managers at his clients to charge
particular prices or an implicit or explicit promise to keep prices low.
Table 8
The pattern of proﬁts around price changes.
Total Proﬁts
(1) (2) (3)
Months in advance of price change:
6 months prior – – 15.045
– – (18.305)
5 months prior – – 17.110
– – (18.695)
4 months prior – – 7.406
– – (17.175)
3 months prior – 12.882 17.954
– (16.068) (17.125)
2 months prior – 10.860 16.349
– (16.158) (17.197)
1 month prior 16.242 5.893 0.256
(16.101) (16.479) (17.590)
Months following a price change:
1 month after 39.002 49.868 55.610
(15.426) (15.755) (16.878)
2 months after – 49.112 54.922
– (15.907) (16.902)
3 months after – 46.338 53.033
– (16.068) (17.064)
4 months after – – 32.411
– – (16.895)
5 months after – – 30.358
– – (17.323)
6 months after – – 7.361
– – (16.593)
Year dummies included? Yes Yes Yes
Month dummies included? Yes Yes Yes
Day of the week dummies included? Yes Yes Yes
R2 0.651 0.653 0.654
F-test:Months prior jointly equal to zero? 0.313 0.740 0.640
F-test:Months after jointly equal to zero? 0.012 0.000 0.001
F-test:Months after jointly different from months prior 0.009 0.001 0.000
Notes: The results in the table are regression coefﬁcients from a time-series regression with one observation per day. The dependent variable is total proﬁt
for the day. Year, month, and day of the week dummies are included in all speciﬁcations. Standard errors in parentheses. The bottom three rows of the table
report p-values from tests that the coefﬁcients on the month(s) immediately preceding or following the price changes are jointly statistically signiﬁcant
different than zero. The number of observations included in the regression is 2262.
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immediately precede and the three that follow each of the price changes for the set of customers for whom there are at least
three deliveries in the month before and the month after the price change. Columns 1 and 2 correspond to numbers before
and after the 1993 bagel price change; column 3 presents the p-value of the difference between the values in those two
columns, controlling for ﬁxed effects by customer. For the great majority of entries in the table, the differences before and
after are highly statistically signiﬁcant. Before the price increase, an average of 52.1 bagels are delivered, of which 48.9 are
eaten. After the price change, the number of bagels delivered falls to 49.1, with 44.5 consumed. The number of donuts
delivered and eaten, surprisingly, also falls slightly. Given the earlier cannibalization results, one would expect consumers to
substitute from bagels to donuts in response to the price increase, but that is not observed. The data instead suggest that the
price increase leads to ill-will among customers. Also consistent with this hypothesis is that the payment rate falls from .916
to .896 with the price increase – a statistically signiﬁcant pattern that is repeated for all four price increases.
After the price rises in August 1993, the ﬁrm's revenues increase, implying that (at least with respect to demand over
a one month horizon) the ﬁrm was operating on the inelastic portion of the demand curve. This cannot be short-run
proﬁt maximizing, and indeed proﬁts are roughly 18% higher in the month after the price change than they were in the
prior month. Under the (admittedly crude) assumption of a linear demand curve with a slope implied by the change in
quantity associated with this price increase, I estimate the bagel price that maximizes short run proﬁt to be $1.26 at that
time – far above the actual price, even after the price increase.26 If that linear demand curve is indeed accurate – which26 This estimate ignores any substitution from bagels to donuts when the price of bagels rises. If consumers switch to donuts, then the optimal price of
bagels would be even higher, because some fraction of the lost bagel sales will be recouped by increased donut sales. Empirically, however, there is no
evidence from any of the four price changes that raising the price of one good materially increases the quantity consumed of the other good.
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optimal price would be roughly $11 higher per delivery, or nearly 60% greater than the proﬁts achieved before the price
change.27
The remaining columns of Table 7 report the results from the other three price changes observed in the data. In every
case, after the price increase, the quantity eaten of that good falls.28 These declines, however, are not sufﬁcient to offset the
increased revenue due to the higher price. Thus, at the time of the ﬁrst three price changes, it appears that the company was
pricing on the inelastic part of the demand curve. Proﬁt rises an average of 5–6% over a one-month horizon in response to
these latter three price changes. The optimal price of a bagel, based on the assumption of a linear demand curve, is $1.21 in
1998 and $2.33 in 2003. It is encouraging that the estimates generated from the ﬁrst two bagel price changes produce
similar values for the optimal price, although the implied value corresponding to the 2003 price change appears too high.
On a recent visit to Dunkin Donuts, a bagel and cream cheese sold for $1.79. The implied optimal price of a donut based on
the 2005 price change is 99 cents, compared to 69 cents at Dunkin Donuts.
One important caveat regarding the apparent mispricing of the goods is that, although price changes are associated with
immediate increases in proﬁts, demand may be more elastic in the long run than the short run. In that case, raising prices
may have adverse consequences for proﬁts down the road. To explore this possibility, I examine the pattern of proﬁts in the
two months preceding the price change and up to six months after the price change. In particular, I estimate time series
regressions of the form
Prof itt ¼ α þ
X2
m ¼ 1
βmPriceChangetþm þ
X6
m ¼ 1
θmPriceChangetm þΓXt þϵt
where t indexes time and m corresponds to the number of months preceding or following a price change. The data are
aggregated across all deliveries in a given day to generate one total proﬁt number for each day. Dummy variables for the
calendar year, the month, and the day of the week are included in the speciﬁcation.
Table 8 reports the results of the estimation for speciﬁcations that consider various time windows before and after the
price change. Column 1 presents results for a one-month window on either side of the price change. Relative to other days in
that calendar year, proﬁts are roughly $16 (standard error of 16) a day lower in the month before the price change and $39
higher in the month after (standard error of 15), for an increase of proﬁts of $55 a day, which is highly statistically sig-
niﬁcant. In column 2, estimates are presented for the three months before and after a price change. The months leading up
to the price change are all insigniﬁcantly different from zero. The coefﬁcients on the months after the price change
are positive and signiﬁcant with values between 46 and 49. There is no evidence that the increment to proﬁts associated
with the price change decays over this time period. When looking at the six months before and after the price change, the
point estimates on the period four to six months after the price change, while still positive, are smaller in magnitude than
those in the ﬁrst three months, and lose statistical signiﬁcance. Thus, consistent with economic theory, it does appear that
demand is more elastic at longer time horizons. Using the estimates from the last column, daily proﬁts are roughly $40 per
day higher after the price change, implying an increase in proﬁts over the six month period of more than $ 4000. 29 Subject
to the limitations of the data, there is no strong evidence that the price changes provide beneﬁts beyond that six month
window. A further caveat on the issue of pricing is that the observed price increases did not lead to entry by competitors. A
larger price increase would have been more likely to induce a direct competitor to enter, negatively impacting this ﬁrm's
proﬁtability.6. Conclusion
Proﬁt maximization is one of the most fundamental assumptions in economics, yet is rarely directly testable because
of data limitations and the complexity of most ﬁrms. This paper provides a case study of the decision making of a ﬁrm
whose activities and administrative data records lend themselves quite naturally to an analysis of the choices it makes
regarding choice of prices and choice of quantities to deliver conditional on these prices. In addition, the primary decision
maker in the ﬁrm is an MIT trained economist. An analysis of the data suggests that the ﬁrm does an exceptionally good job
of making the daily decision regarding the quantities to deliver to customers. In stark contrast, the evidence seems to
suggest that the ﬁrm has charged prices below the optimal level for more than a decade, although the conclusions about
pricing are subject to important caveats since short-run responses to price changes are more readily observable than long-
run responses.
The ﬁndings of this paper apply directly only to the ﬁrm in question, but there may be reasons to believe that the results
obtained here are more broadly generalizable. It is not by chance that the ﬁrm does well in choosing what quantity to deliver.27 The estimated number of bagels consumed at a price of $1.26 is roughly 30. In my optimal proﬁt calculation, I assume that the ﬁrm will have the
same number of uneaten bagels at the optimal price, that the payment rate for bagels will fall to .85, and that the proﬁt generated by donuts will be
unchanged.
28 The quantities of the other good change only slightly in response to the price increase, declining in three of the four instances.
29 There are no statistically signiﬁcant differences between the rate at which customers appear or disappear from the sample before and after price
increases.
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of data in making the quantity decision. Any mistakes on the quantity dimension are quickly revealed and corrected. In
contrast, the ﬁrm rarely changes prices – only four times in the entire 13 year period – and thus gets little feedback regarding
the right price. Without feedback, the ﬁrm has no direct mechanism for learning whether it is pricing correctly.
The fundamental question that remains unanswered, however, is why this ﬁrm did not actively seek to create
mechanisms to provide feedback on pricing. 30 For instance, since the ﬁrm serves customers at many locations who pre-
sumably have little or no contact with one another, it would have been possible for the ﬁrm to charge different prices across
locations without the customers being aware. By varying prices exogenously, the ﬁrm could have learned about the elas-
ticity of customer demand, as well as potentially price discriminating across customers.
This ﬁrm is not alone in missing out on opportunities to increase feedback to drive learning. The most straightforward
and powerful tool for generating feedback is a randomized experiment. Whereas randomization is the norm in clinical
studies, it is rarely used in business settings (Levitt and List, 2009). Understanding why this is the case stands as an
important direction for future research.7. Data appendix
The data used in this paper were provided by the founder of the company. Recent years of data were in Excel spread-
sheets; earlier years were in hard copy that were scanned or hand entered.
The primary use of the data was for accounting purposes. A number of steps were taken to clean the data for the analysis
in this paper. I exclude all clients in which the company prepays, as opposed to the goods being purchased on the honor
system. In a handful of cases, there were small variations in company names over time, although it is clear from the data that
these represent the same customers and were treated accordingly. When multiple deliveries were made to different ﬂoors
of the same company, or to the same ﬂoor on different days of the week, these were treated as different customers. I
excluded all observations in which the quantity delivered of bagels and donuts are both reported as zero, and all obser-
vations in which no quantities eaten were reported in the data. On the advice of the company, I excluded cases in which the
revenues received were either less than 25% of the number that would have been expected based on the posted prices and
the number of products consumed, or more than 150% of the expected number; the company says that occasionally they
lump together the results of multiple deliveries to a client in their bookkeeping. In a small number of cases, the accounting
identity regarding costs, revenues, and proﬁts for a delivery did not hold. These observations were dropped, as were
duplicate entries corresponding to the same delivery. I also dropped a small number of cases in which the quantities
delivered were far higher than in the preceding and following weeks.
The data I was given has information on the total cost associated with the products delivered to a given client on a
particular day, but is not speciﬁcally broken out between bagels, cream cheese, and donuts. To estimate marginal cost of a
bagel (including cream cheese), I limit the sample to customers who only receive bagels (no donuts) and run regressions by
calendar year with the total product cost on the left-hand side and the number of bagels delivered on the right-hand side,
with no constant. Because the wholesale cost of the product ﬂuctuates within a calendar year and the ratio of bagels to
cream cheese varies by customer, the ﬁt of the regression is less than one. In all but two years of the sample, the R-squared
of this regression is above .99. I then estimate the marginal cost of a donut by subtracting off the ﬁtted value of the costs of
the bagels delivered and running a parallel regression on donuts. The R-squared of this regression is above .97 in all but two
years. The resulting data set includes just over 80,000 valid customer deliveries.References
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